Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies
Volume 25

Article 1

1-1-2016

Realizing the Precautionary Principle in Due Diligence
Ling Chen

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.schulichlaw.dal.ca/djls
Part of the Law Commons

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative
Works 3.0 License.
Recommended Citation
Ling Chen, "Realizing the Precautionary Principle in Due Diligence" (2016) 25 Dal J Leg Stud 1.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Schulich Law Scholars. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies by an authorized editor of Schulich Law Scholars. For
more information, please contact hannah.steeves@dal.ca.

Vol. 25

1

Ling Chen*

ABSTRACT
The precautionary principle is a legal principle that has found considerable
support in international environmental law. Its emergence, however, has not
been without problems and controversies: how do we define its normative
content and trigger elements, and how do we ensure concrete implementation.
The 2011 Seabed Mining Advisory Opinion used states’ due diligence obligations
to prevent harm to realize the precautionary principle. Focusing on this case,
this article examines how the precautionary principle can be applied using the
concept of due diligence. First, this article explores the precautionary concept
using examples from a selection of regional and multilateral environmental
instruments, analyzing its origin and different expressions and identifying the
problems in its application. Second, the article analyzes the Pulp Mills case and
the Seabed Mining Advisory Opinion to substantiate the role of the obligation to
take precautionary measures in the legal framework of due diligence. Third, by
reference to the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on Prevention
of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities and the International Law
Association’s study report on the Legal Principles relating to Climate Change,
along with a number of international cases, the article further illustrates the
distinction between due diligence, prevention and precaution and argues that
they are actually interrelated.
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The precautionary principle is one of the emergent legal principles that has
received increased awareness from states and academic literature.1 Although this
principle has achieved a level of sophistication in international environmental law,
a uniform understanding has not been reached regarding its meaning, normative
content, and legal status.2 Nor has its application and consequence become
precise.3 In 2011, however, the advisory opinion of the Seabed Disputes Chamber
of the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) on Responsibilities and
Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with respect to Activities in the Area
(Seabed Mining Advisory Opinion) shed some light on the concrete application of the
precautionary approach.4 The Chamber indicated that the precautionary
approach is “an integral part of the general obligation of due diligence.”5 Up until
now, precaution and the due diligence obligation to prevent harm have been

For detailed analyses of the use of precautionary concept in national laws, and regional and international
instruments see e.g. James Cameron & Juli Abouchar, “The Precautionary Principle: A Fundamental
Principle of Law and Policy for the Protection of the Global Environment” (1991) 14:1 Boston College
Intl & Comp L Rev 1 at 4–18; Chris Tollefson & Jamie Thornback, “Litigating the Precautionary Principle
in Domestic Courts” (2008) 19:1 J Envtl L & Prac 33 at 35–48; Andri G Wibisana, “The Development of
the Precautionary Principle in International and Indonesian Environmental Law” (2011) 14 Asia Pac J
Envtl L 169 at 172–78, 190–202 [Wibisana]. A large number of academic writings have touched on this
topic. See e.g. David Freestone & Ellen Hey, eds, The Precautionary Principle and International Law: The
Challenge of Implementation (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1996) [Freestone & Hey]; Joakim Zander,
The Application of the Precautionary Principle in Practice: Comparative Dimensions (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2010); James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law, 8th ed (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2012) at 357–58 [Crawford]; Bénédicte Sage-Fuller, The Precautionary Principle in
Marine Environmental Law, With Special Reference to High Risk Vessels (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2013)
[Sage-Fuller].
2 Philippe Sands, Principles of International Environmental Law, 2nd ed (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2003) at 272; Barbara Nicoletti, “The Prevention of Natural and Man-Made Disasters: What Duties for
States?” in Andrea de Guttry, Marco Gestri & Gabriella Venturini, eds, International Disaster Response Law
(The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2012) 177 at 188; Wibisana, supra note 1 at 170–71; Crawford, supra note
1 at 357; Sage-Fuller, supra note 1 at 82.
3 James E Hickey, Jr & Vern R Walker, “Refining the Precautionary Principle in International Environmental
Law” (1995) 14:3 Va Envtl LJ 423 at 424–25; Cass R Sunstein, “Beyond the Precautionary Principle”
(2003) 151:3 U Pa L Rev 1003 at 1004–08; Elizabeth Tedsen & Gesa Homann, “Implementing the
Precautionary Principle for Climate Engineering” (2013) 7:2 Carbon & Climate L Rev 90 at 94–95 [Tedsen
& Homann].
4 Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with respect to Activities in the Area (1 February
2011), Advisory Opinion, the Seabed Disputes Chamber of the International Tribunal on the Law of the
Sea, No 17 [Seabed Mining Advisory Opinion]. “The Seabed Disputes Chamber is competent to give an
advisory opinion on legal questions arising within the scope of the activities of the Assembly or Council of
the International Seabed Authority.” See ITLOS, Jurisdiction, online:
<https://www.itlos.org/jurisdiction/>.
5 Seabed Mining Advisory Opinion, supra note 4 at para 131.
1

Vol. 25

3

widely treated as separate principles. The Chamber’s reasoning highlights the fact
that they are actually interrelated.
This article draws upon the obligations of due diligence to clarify the
question of how to apply the precautionary principle even though the principle
itself has not yet emerged as an independent international custom. In section one,
I explore the precautionary concept by analyzing the origin and different
expressions of this concept (the precautionary principle, the precautionary
approach and precautionary measures). I also present the problems in applying
the precautionary principle. In section two, I conduct case analyses to observe
the role that the duty to take precautionary measures plays in the legal framework
of due diligence. The analytical framework elaborated in the 2010 Pulp Mills on the
River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay)6 and the 2011 Seabed Mining Advisory Opinion
will serve to inform this paper. As the principles of precaution and due diligence
are also closely related to the obligation to prevent harm, I further illustrate the
distinction and interrelation between these three concepts in section three. I refer
to the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on Prevention of
Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities (2001 Draft Articles)7 and
the International Law Association’s study report on the Legal Principles relating
to Climate Change.8 These two instruments have elaborated on the relationship
between prevention, precaution and due diligence.

Following the common law maxim “sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas” (use
your own property in such a way as not to injure that of others),9 the notion of
Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay), [2010] ICJ Rep 14 [Pulp Mills].
International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities, with
Commentaries (2001) [ILC].
8 International Law Association, Washington Conference Report: Legal Principles relating to Climate Change (2014)
[ILA].
9 More details about this maxim see Elmer E Smead, “Sic Utere Tuo Ut Alienum Non Laedas: A Basis of the
State Police Power” (1936) 21:2 Cornell L Rev 276; Greg Lynham, “The Sic Utere Principle as Customary
International Law: A Case of Wishful Thinking?” (1995) 2 James Cook U L Rev 172.
6
7
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prevention is used in international law to deal with transboundary harm. The
obligation to prevent transboundary harm was elaborated in principle 21 of the
1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment (Stockholm
Declaration).10 It imposes an obligation on states not to cause damage to “the
environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction”
when they exercise their sovereign right to “exploit their own natural resources
pursuant to their own environmental policies.”11 The 2001 Draft Articles
affirmed this obligation in article 3, which reads, “The State of origin shall take
all appropriate measures to prevent significant transboundary harm or at any
event to minimize the risk thereof.”12
Under the obligation of prevention, states should ensure that activities
within their jurisdiction do not harm an extraterritorial environment. All states
are obligated to prevent cross-border environmental hazards and activities that
entail foreseeable environmental risks. They are also required to take international
responsibility for the wrongful acts under their control. However, states are only
responsible for activities that are (or can be) proved with clear evidence or the
existence of foreseeable risks.13 Thus, when clear scientific evidence does not
exist or when an environmental risk has not been reasonably foreseeable, the
obligation of prevention is unable to require states to regulate environmental
risks.14 The emergence of the precautionary concept was an attempt to fill this
gap.

The precautionary concept originated from the concept of “vorsorgeprinzip”
(foresight) in German environmental law in 1971.15 This concept evolved
gradually through regional environmental agreements in the 1980s. For example,
the Ministerial Declaration Calling for Reduction of Pollution, adopted in the
Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, 16 June 1972, 11 ILM 1416 [Stockholm Declaration].
Ibid, principle 21.
12 ILC, supra note 7 at 153.
13 ILC, ibid at 153–54; Sage-Fuller, supra note 1 at 79.
14 Freestone & Hey, supra note 1 at 54.
15 Ibid at 4; Tedsen & Homann, supra note 3 at 91.
10
11
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Second International Conference on the Protection of the North Sea, declared
that “[in] order to protect the North Sea from possibly damaging effects of the
most dangerous substances, a precautionary approach is necessary which may
require action to control inputs of such substances even before a causal link has
been established by absolute clear scientific evidence.”16 Numerous multilateral
agreements have since appropriated the precautionary concept directly or
indirectly to control environmental pollution, and to protect marine and
atmospheric environment and international biological resources. Principle 15 of
the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (Rio Declaration)
is a representative example:
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall
be widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there
are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific
certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective
measures to prevent environmental degradation.17

This definition demonstrates that the precautionary approach was
established to bypass the traditional rules of evidence that cannot effectively
respond to or deal with a situation in which clear scientific evidence for
environmental harm or risk is inadequate. The precautionary principle
emphasizes that the implementation of necessary measures, in the occurrence of
environmental risks, should not be postponed due to the lack of scientific
certainty. This principle has an important role to play in effectively coping with
environmental risks of scientific uncertainty.

The precautionary concept has been incorporated into a number of
international environmental instruments. The specific terms that reflect this
concept include the precautionary principle, the precautionary approach and
precautionary measures.

16
17

Freestone & Hey, supra note 1 at 5.
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 14 June 1992, 31 ILM 874, principle 15 [Rio Declaration].
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The term “precautionary principle” is not explicitly used to address the
concept of precaution in multilateral environmental agreements. Article 2.5 (a) of
the 1992 Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses
and International Lakes requires states to follow the precautionary principle.
Measures to prevent cross-border effects of hazardous substances should not be
postponed due to non-existence of clear scientific evidence that could prove the
causal link between those hazardous substances and their potential transboundary
effects.18
The notions of prevention and precaution were combined in the 1991
Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and the Control of
Transboundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes within Africa
(Bamako Convention).19 Article 4.3 (f) of this convention provides that each state
shall endeavor to adopt preventive and precautionary approaches to avoid the
damage caused by substances released in the environment. In achieving this goal,
states shall take appropriate measures in a cooperative manner to implement the
precautionary principle, which does not require waiting for scientific evidence to
prove harm to the environment.20 As well, article 2.2 (a) of the 1992 Convention
for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic
requires states to apply the precautionary principle.21 They should adopt
preventive measures when there are reasonable grounds to believe that direct or
indirect discharge of substances into the marine environment may “[endanger]
human health, harm living resources and marine ecosystems, damage amenities
or interfere with other legitimate uses of the sea, even when there is no conclusive
evidence of a causal relationship between the inputs and the effects.”22

Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes, 17 March 1992, 1936
UNTS 269 (entered into force 6 October 1996), art 2.5 (a).
19 Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and the Control of Transboundary Movement and Management of
Hazardous Wastes within Africa, 29 January 1991, 30 ILM 773.
20 Ibid, art 4.3 (f).
21 Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic, 22 September 1992, 2354 UNTS
67 (entered into force 25 March 1998), art 2.2 (a).
22 Ibid.
18

Vol. 25

7

Instead of explicitly using the term “precautionary principle”, several
instruments require states to take a precautionary approach when trigger elements
are satisfied.23 Article 6 of the 1995 Agreement for the Implementation of the
Provisions of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea relating to the
Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory
Fish Stocks (Fish Stocks Agreement) stipulates the application of the
precautionary approach.24 States are required to widely use the precautionary
approach to conserve, manage and exploit the stocks of straddling fish and highly
migratory fish25 and “shall be more cautious when information is uncertain,
unreliable or inadequate.”26 They cannot delay or refuse to take conservation and
management measures because of inadequate scientific information.27
Meanwhile, in order to strengthen states’ capacity to manage risks and facilitate
the development of relevant technologies, this agreement requires states to
implement the precautionary approach by drawing upon the best available
scientific information and technology to deal with risks and uncertainties,
considering uncertainties related to the size and productivity of fish stocks, and
collecting data to assess the impact of fishing activities on other associated or
independent species and oceanic environment.28
The overall purpose of the 2000 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the
Convention on Biological Diversity (Cartagena Protocol) is to control
transboundary movements of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) based on
the precautionary concept.29 This concept has been reflected in many parts of the

Arguably, trigger elements include “reasonable foreseeability of damage falling short of conclusive scientific
proof” and “a threat of serious or irreversible damage”. See ILA, supra note 8 at 24.
24 UNGA, Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, 6th Sess, Agreement for the
Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to
the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, UN Doc
A/CONF.164/37, September 1995.
25 Ibid, art 6.1.
26 Ibid, art 6.2.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid, art 6.3.
29 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, 29 January 2000, 2226 UNTS 208 (entered
into force 11 September 2003) [Cartagena Protocol].
23
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Cartagena Protocol. Paragraph 4 of its preamble is a literal reaffirmation of the
precautionary approach elaborated in principle 15 of the Rio Declaration.30
Article 1 provides that the precautionary approach should be adopted to
achieve the objective of this protocol.31 Articles 10 (6) and 11 (8) do not use the
term “precautionary approach”, but the language in these two articles denotes the
precautionary concept, including language targeting a “lack of scientific
certainty”, “insufficient relevant scientific information and knowledge” and the
“avoid[ance] or minimiz[ation of]…potential adverse effects”.32 The Cartagena
Protocol is a good example of the capacity of the precautionary concept to deal
with a specific environmental problem.

The term “precautionary measures” is also used to reflect the precautionary
concept. One example is the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete
the Ozone Layer.33 In its preamble paragraph 6, parties to this protocol were
determined to “protect the ozone layer by taking precautionary measures to
control equitably total global emissions that deplete it.”34 Paragraph 8 notes that
some precautionary measures have been taken to control the release of certain
chlorofluorocarbons at the national and regional level.35 Similarly, article 3.3 of
the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) provides
that:
The Parties should take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent
or minimize the causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse
effects. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack
of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing
such measures, taking into account that policies and measures to deal

Ibid, preamble, para 4.
Ibid, art 1.
32 Ibid, arts 10 (6), 11 (8).
33 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 16 September 1987, 1522 UNTS 3 (entered into
force 1 January 1989).
34 Ibid, preamble, para 6.
35 Ibid, preamble, para 8.
30
31
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with climate change should be cost-effective so as to ensure global
benefits at the lowest possible cost.36

In order to make the obligations of limiting the use of fossil fuels under the
UNFCCC more specific and clear, nearly 160 states negotiated and agreed to
adopt the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC (Kyoto Protocol) in 1997.37 While the
term “precautionary measures” do not appear in the protocol, paragraph 4 of its
preamble addresses that this protocol should refer to article 3 of the UNFCCC. 38
Thus, the Kyoto Protocol still embraced the idea of precaution and regarded it as
a justification for taking measures to reduce emissions.
In addition to the direct use of “precaution” in provisions, some instruments
only have provisions that implicitly reflect the precautionary concept. Besides
articles 10 (6) and 11 (8) of the Cartagena Protocol discussed above, another
example is the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD).39 Paragraph 9 of
its preamble provides that when biodiversity suffers “a serious threat of
significant reduction or loss”, lack of adequate scientific certainty cannot be a
reason for postponing measures that aim to avoid or minimize such threats.40 In
contrast to the Rio Declaration and other multilateral environmental agreements
that directly used the term of precautionary principle, precautionary approach or
precautionary measure, the CBD did not draw upon these terms but elaborated
the precautionary concept in its provisions. Although the CBD is viewed as an
instrument that intends to adopt the precautionary concept for use in practice,
the drafters’ use of language (i.e., avoiding the direct use of the term “precaution”
and providing the precautionary concept in the preamble) shows that state parties
simply wished to regard the precautionary concept as a reference material rather
than as a binding legal obligation.

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 9 May 1992, 1771 UNTS 107 (entered into force 21
March 1994), art 3.3.
37 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 11 December 1997, 2303 UNTS 148
(entered into force 16 February 2005).
38 Ibid, preamble, para 4.
39 Convention on Biological Diversity, 5 June 1992, 1760 UNTS 79 (entered into force 29 December 1993).
40 Ibid, preamble, para 9.
36
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Despite various permutations of the precautionary concept found in the
instruments above, the content of precaution is similar. The concept arguably
consists of the types of risk (serious, irreversible or other types), the degree of
scientific uncertainty, the criteria that should be considered in the decision making
process (proportionality and cost-effect analysis), and a shifting burden of
proof.41
The precautionary principle highlights that the lack of full scientific certainty
should not be used as a reason for postponing the use of cost-effective measures
to prevent environmental degradation. It may serve as a general reference or
policy guideline for decision-makers to manage environmental risks when there
exists scientific uncertainty. In contrast to the precautionary principle as a legal
principle, the precautionary approach and precautionary measures are expedient
and temporary tools based on the precautionary concept to achieve the goal of
risk management. Fewer conventions directly use the term “principle” than the
terms “approach” or “measures”. One reason may be that the term “principle”
may direct a court to view it as a source of law. In other words, the precautionary
principle may convey a more compulsory meaning than the precautionary
approach and precautionary measures.42
Meanwhile, the precautionary concept is mostly reflected in the preambles
of multilateral environmental instruments, thus serving a symbolic role. The
principle lacks any specific and clear implementation mechanisms and does not
create concrete or practical obligations for states. Even if several instruments
(e.g., the Bamako Convention, the Fish Stocks Agreement and the Cartagena
Protocol) have specific provisions for implementing the precautionary approach,
it is still too early to conclude that they have made a real contribution to the
implementation of the precautionary principle. For example, major GMOs
exporting states such as the US and Argentina have not signed or ratified the
Cartagena Protocol, whereas many parties to this protocol have less influence in
Tedsen & Homann, supra note 3 at 93; Miguel A. Recuerda, “Dangerous Interpretations of the
Precautionary Principle and the Foundational Values of European Union Food Law: Risk Versus Risk”
(2008) 4:1 J Food L & Policy 1 at 19 [Recuerda].
42 Recuerda, supra note 41 at 5.
41
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producing, selling or importing the GMOs.43 Similarly, although the
precautionary concept appears in many parts of the Cartagena Protocol, it only
uses the term “precautionary approach” in its preamble and text. Articles 10 (6) and
11 (8) are the specific provisions to implement the precautionary approach, but
they do not directly use precaution in their wordings.44

Since the emergence of the precautionary concept, a series of controversies
have arisen over its precise normative content, trigger elements and legal status
in international law. The specific questions include “the level and type of harm
that would justify action, the amount of knowledge needed to justify action, the
types of actions that would be appropriate as precautionary measures, and under
what circumstances these would be appropriate.”45 While several international
instruments have direct and indirect provisions that reflect the precautionary
concept, they have no specific provisions to implement this concept. If trigger
elements of this principle are uncertain, measures taken to avoid risks under the
precautionary concept may cause more controversies. Thus, the precautionary
principle or precautionary approach should be undertaken in a more cautious way
to reduce its adverse impacts. Two recent cases seem to have implications for the
application of precaution.

See UNTS, “Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity” (status as at 12
September 2016), online:
<https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-8a&chapter=27&clang=_en>; Natural Revolution, “List of Countries That Banned Genetically Modified
Food” (9 February 2015), online: <http://naturalrevolution.org/list-countries-banned-geneticallymodified-food/>.
44 Cartagena Protocol, supra note 29, arts 10 (6), 11 (8).
45 Tedsen & Homann, supra note 3 at 94.
43
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In the 2010 Pulp Mills case, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) decided
that Uruguay violated the obligation to notify Argentina under article 7 of the
Statute of the River Uruguay signed by Uruguay and Argentina in 1975 (1975
Statute).46 Uruguay had not informed the Administrative Commission of the
River Uruguay (CARU) of its plans before granting environmental authorizations
for the CMB (ENCE) mill and the Orion (Botnia) mill and for the port terminal
at Fray Bentos.47
In reaching its decision, the ICJ noted that the obligation to notify CARU is
a necessary part of fulfilling the obligation of prevention. With such notification,
the parties may “consult in order to assess the risks of the plan and to negotiate
possible changes which may eliminate those risks or minimize their effects.”48
The Court restated the status of the preventive principle as an international
custom and pointed out that this principle had originated from the obligation of
due diligence.49 Its analysis was based on the specific holding from the Corfu
Channel case that every state had the “obligation not to allow knowingly its
territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States.”50 The Advisory
Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Nuclear Weapons Advisory
Opinion) echoed this point, stating: “[t]he existence of the general obligation of
States to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction and control respect the

The Statute of the River Uruguay, 26 February 1975, 1982 UNTS 339 (entered into force 18 September 1976)
[1975 Statute].
47 Pulp Mills, supra note 6 at paras 111, 122.
48 Ibid at para 115.
49 Ibid at para 101.
50 Corfu Channel (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v Albania), [1949] ICJ Rep 4 at 22.
46
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environment of other States or of areas beyond national control is now part of
the corpus of international law relating to the environment.”51
A state should take all possible measures to discharge the obligation of
prevention. Under article 36 of the 1975 Statute, both Uruguay and Argentina
had the obligation to take measures to avoid changes in the ecological balance of
the Uruguay River.52 These measures included both the adoption of a regulatory
or administrative framework and the compliance by both parties to that
framework.53 The obligation to adopt regulatory measures could be regarded as
an “obligation of conduct”.54 The ICJ suggested Uruguay and Argentina to
“exercise due diligence…to preserve the ecological balance of the river.”55 Article
41 of the 1975 Statute has a similar provision, obligating states to “prevent
pollution and preserve the aquatic environment.”56 This obligation should also be
taken with due diligence. In addition to the adoption and enforcement of
appropriate measures, the obligations of due diligence under this article require
that these measures be “in accordance with applicable international agreements
and in keeping, where relevant, with the guidelines and recommendations of
international technical bodies.”57 Thus, the measures taken by states to realize the
obligation of due diligence should conform to both domestic laws and regulations
and international agreements and standards.

When addressing the preliminary issue of the “burden of proof” in this case,
the ICJ mentioned the relevance of the precautionary approach in interpreting
and applying the provisions of the 1975 Statute.58 However, the court did not
follow Argentina’s argument that a precautionary approach operates as a reversal
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, [1996] ICJ Rep 226 at para 29 [Nuclear
Weapons Advisory Opinion].
52 1975 Statute, supra note 46, art 36.
53 Pulp Mills, supra note 6 at para 187.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid at para 190.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid at paras 159–60, 164.
51
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of the burden of proof, placing the burden of proof equally on both Argentina
and Uruguay.59 It insisted on the principle of onus probandi incumbit actori that, “[I]t
is the duty of the party which asserts certain facts to establish the existence of
such facts.”60 The burden of proof was still on Argentina to show Uruguay’s
breach of obligations under the 1975 Statute.
However, Judges Awn Al-Khasawneh, Bruno Simma and Cançado Trindade
in this case indicated the possible application of the precautionary principle.61
Judges Al-Khasawneh and Simma contended that the Court should consider the
environmental risk posed on the Uruguay River after the completion of pulp mills
rather than restrict its consideration to the identified risks or the harm that had
occurred.62 They regretted that the Court had not made a contribution to
resolving scientifically complex disputes.63
Judge Trindade shared a similar opinion with Al-Khasawneh and Simma. He
criticized the Court’s silence in deciding the relationship between the preventive
principle and the precautionary principle.64 He also questioned whether the Court
had acted with too much prudence and caution with respect to the precautionary
principle.65 It was Trindade’s opinion that the precautionary principle is a
“reasonable assessment in face of probable risks and scientific uncertainties.”66
This principle could be implemented by undertaking “environmental impact
assessments, further studies on the environmental issues at stake, as well as
careful environmental risk analysis.”67 He believed that the mere application of
the preventive principle could not suffice to resolve the dispute. Instead of fully

Ibid at para 164.
Ibid at para 162.
61 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay), [2010] ICJ Rep 14, Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges
Al-Khasawneh and Simma at paras 25, 28 [Al-Khasawneh & Simma]; Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay
(Argentina v Uruguay), [2010] ICJ Rep 14, Separate Opinion of Judge Trindade at paras 67, 96 [Trindade].
62 Al-Khasawneh & Simma, supra note 61 at para 25.
63 Ibid at para 28.
64 Trindade, supra note 61 at para 67.
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid at para 96.
67 Ibid.
59
60
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relying on the prevention of harm, he turned the attention to the precautionary
principle by examining risks and scientific uncertainties.68

In 2011, the Seabed Disputes Chamber of the ITLOS adopted an advisory
opinion to clarify states parties’ legal responsibilities and obligations in
sponsoring activities in the seabed area beyond national jurisdiction (Area).69 The
Chamber considered the notions of due diligence and precaution by connecting
sponsoring states’ direct obligations with the obligations of due diligence. 70 The
obligations of due diligence require a state to exercise best possible efforts to
avoid harm to the Area or other states. The specific content of due diligence may
be ascertained by referring to direct obligations undertaken by the state.

The Chamber first analyzed the obligation “to ensure compliance and
liability for damage” (obligation to ensure) by interpreting article 139 of the 1982
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and article 4 of Annex III to
UNCLOS.71 Article 139 (1) of UNCLOS makes states responsible “to ensure that
activities in the Area, whether carried out by States Parties, or state enterprises or
natural or juridical persons which possess the nationality of States Parties or are
effectively controlled by them or their nationals, shall be carried out in conformity
with this Part.”72 Article 4 (4) of Annex III adds more requirements to article 139,
Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay), [2010] ICJ Rep 14, Annex to Summary of the Judgment
at 5.
69 “The Seabed Disputes Chamber is established in accordance with Part XI, section 5, of [UNCLOS]…The
Chamber has jurisdiction in disputes with respect to activities in the International Seabed Area.” See
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Chambers, online: <https://www.itlos.org/thetribunal/chambers/>. See also Seabed Mining Advisory Opinion, supra note 4.
70 In order to conduct exploration and exploitation activities in the international seabed area, natural or judicial
persons should be “either nationals of a State Party or effectively controlled by it or its nationals” and
“sponsored by such States”. States that provide such sponsorship are called sponsoring states; agreements
that are entered by sponsoring states and natural or judicial persons are called sponsoring agreement;
natural or judicial persons that enter a sponsoring agreement with sponsoring states are called contractors.
See Seabed Mining Advisory Opinion, supra note 4 at paras 74–81.
71 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 3 (entered into force 16
November 1994) [UNCLOS].
72 Ibid, art 139 (1).
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“[Sponsoring states]…shall…have the responsibility to ensure, within their legal
systems, that a contractor so sponsored shall carry out activities in the Area in
conformity with the terms of its contract and its obligations under this
Convention.”73 A sponsoring state may be exempted from liability if the state
“has adopted laws and regulations and taken administrative measures which are,
within the framework of its legal system, reasonably appropriate for securing
compliance by persons under its jurisdiction.”74
Under the Chamber’s interpretation, the state’s obligation may be regarded
as an obligation “of conduct” but not “of result”.75 The Chamber stated that this
obligation should not be understood as requiring sponsoring states to comply
with UNCLOS in all circumstances. However, sponsoring states should take
adequate measures, “to exercise best possible efforts, to do the utmost, to obtain
this result.”76 The Chamber further highlighted the close connection between
obligations of conduct and obligations of due diligence.77 Despite the difficult
task of describing the content of due diligence, the Chamber’s analyses seem to
have some helpful implications for deciding what measures can be considered as
sufficiently diligent. For instance, the Chamber stated that it was necessary to
consider the level of technological development at a certain time since the
emergence of new science or technology may increase the level of requirement
for due diligence.78 The extent of due diligence also depends on the risks arising
from activities. The activities of high risk in the Area will accordingly require a
high degree of due diligence.79
Additional elements relevant to the content of due diligence can be explored
by interpreting article 153 (4) of UNCLOS and Annex III article 4 (4). According
to article 153 (4) of UNCLOS, states parties shall take all measures to assist the
International Seabed Authority to ensure compliance with article 139,80 including
Ibid, Annex III, art 4 (4).
Ibid.
75 Seabed Mining Advisory Opinion, supra note 4 at para 110.
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid at para 111.
78 Ibid at para 117.
79 Ibid.
80 UNCLOS, supra note 71, art 153 (4).
73
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Vol. 25

17

“compliance with the relevant provisions of this Part and the Annexes relating
thereto, and the rules, regulations and procedures of the [International Seabed]
Authority, and the plans of work approved in accordance with [article 153 (3)].”81
Also, article 4 (4) of Annex III requires sponsoring states to fulfill the obligation
to ensure compliance with and liability for damage within the scope of their own
legal system.82 These provisions both require sponsoring states to deploy all
reasonably appropriate measures within their legal system, including adopting
laws and taking administrative action. The extent of “reasonably appropriate”
depends on whether these laws, regulations or administrative measures can
suffice to secure compliance by persons under a state’s jurisdiction.83
The Chamber considered the adoption of laws, regulations and
administrative action and the establishment of relevant enforcement mechanisms
as a necessary condition for states to comply with the obligation of due
diligence.84 Merely entering into a sponsoring agreement between the sponsoring
state and the sponsored contractor cannot be considered as compliance with the
obligation of due diligence. The arrangement of signing a contract does not
suffice to substitute the legal, regulatory and administrative measures.85 The
Chamber suggested some necessary measures to help implement sponsoring
states’ obligations, including, for example, adding provisions regarding “financial
viability and technical capacity of sponsored contractors, conditions for issuing a
certificate of sponsorship and penalties for non-compliance by such
contractors.”86 In addition, the Chamber noted that the measures adopted by
sponsoring states may not be perpetually appropriate, so they should be reviewed
continuously so that they can meet the existing standards.87

Ibid.
Ibid, Annex III, art 4 (4).
83 Seabed Mining Advisory Opinion, supra note 4 at para 119.
84 Ibid at para 218.
85 Ibid at paras 223–24.
86 Ibid at para 234.
87 Ibid at para 222.
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The obligations of sponsoring states are not simply restricted to the
obligations of due diligence. They also include several direct obligations.88 Under
UNCLOS, the 2000 Nodules Regulations, the 2010 Sulphides Regulations and
other relevant instruments, sponsoring states are obligated to adopt a
precautionary approach, to apply best environmental practices, to ensure the
availability of recourse for compensation, to take measures to ensure the
provision of guarantees in the event of an emergency order by the Authority for
protecting the marine environment, and to conduct environmental impact
assessment.89 Although the Seabed Disputes Chamber considered these direct
obligations as independent from the obligations of due diligence, it also stressed
that direct obligations and obligations of due diligence were closely interrelated
because the fulfillment of direct obligations could satisfy the requirements of due
diligence.90 In other words, the content of due diligence can be determined by
interpreting sponsoring states’ direct obligations.
Adopting a precautionary approach is an essential part of the direct
obligations for sponsoring states. The Seabed Disputes Chamber conducted a
detailed analysis of the application of a precautionary approach. The Chamber
did not directly refer to the precautionary approach elaborated in principle 15 of
the Rio Declaration due to its non-binding force. Instead, the Chamber drew
upon the Sulphides Regulations and the Nodules Regulations that “[transformed
the] non-binding statement of the precautionary approach in the Rio Declaration
into a binding obligation.”91 Regulation 31 (2) of the Nodules Regulations and
regulation 33 (2) of the Sulphides Regulations both provide that, “In order to
ensure effective protection for the marine environment from harmful effects
Ibid at para 121.
Ibid at para 122. The International Seabed Authority (ISA) adopted the Nodules Regulations in 2000 and the
Sulphides Regulations in 2010 to regulate the prospecting, exploration and exploitation of marine minerals
in the international seabed area. See ISA, “The 2000 Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration for
Polymetallic Nodules in the Area” (13 July 2000), online:
<http://www.isa.org.jm/files/documents/EN/Regs/MiningCode.pdf> [2000 Nodules Regulations]; ISA,
“The 2010 Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration for Polymetallic Sulphides in the Area” (7 May
2010), online: <http://www.isa.org.jm/files/documents/EN/Regs/PolymetallicSulphides.pdf> [2010
Sulphides Regulations].
90 Seabed Mining Advisory Opinion, supra note 4 at para 123.
91 Ibid at paras 125–27.
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which may arise from activities in the Area, the Authority and sponsoring States
shall apply a precautionary approach, as reflected in Principle 15 of the Rio
Declaration.”92 Under the Rio Declaration principle 15, states shall apply the
precautionary approach widely to the environmental protection. But, this
principle has limited the scope of the precautionary approach to “threats of
serious or irreversible damage” and to “cost-effective measures to prevent
environmental degradation”.93 Additionally, the Sulphides Regulations not only
stimulate sponsoring states’ obligation to adopt precautionary approach but also
require prospectors, Secretary-Generals, and contractors to take this approach to
“prevent, reduce and control pollution and other hazards”.94
Elaborating the precautionary approach into the binding Nodules
Regulations and the Sulphides Regulations is not the only way to give this
approach binding force on signatory states. The Chamber noted that “the
precautionary approach is also an integral part of the general obligation of due
diligence of sponsoring States.”95 The application of a precautionary approach
may facilitate the fulfillment of a sponsoring state’s obligation of due diligence.
As previously discussed, it is necessary to take all appropriate measures to fulfill
the obligation of due diligence as long as their activities have potential
environmental risks, even in the absence of full scientific evidence of their adverse
effects. Thus, the Chamber concluded that “a sponsoring State would not meet
its obligation of due diligence if it disregarded those risks. Such disregard would
amount to a failure to comply with the precautionary approach.”96

See 2000 Nodules Regulations, supra note 89, regulation 31 (2); 2010 Sulphides Regulations, supra note 89,
regulation 33 (2).
93 Rio Declaration, supra note 17, principle 15.
94 See 2010 Sulphides Regulations, supra note 89, regulations 2 (2), 5 (1), 33 (5).
95 Seabed Mining Advisory Opinion, supra note 4 at para 131.
96 Ibid.
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The obligation to prevent transboundary harm has become a principle of
customary international environmental law.97 It can find adequate support from
international instruments and case law. Both the Stockholm Declaration principle
21 and the Rio Declaration principle 2 have enshrined this obligation. In terms
of international cases, Trail Smelter, Corfu Channel and Lac Lanoux cases have
supported the existence of this obligation.98 In 1996, the ICJ confirmed that this
obligation was “part of the corpus of international law relating to the
environment” in its Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion.99 The ICJ subsequently
reaffirmed this trend in Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros by stating that, “vigilance and
prevention are required on account of the often irreversible character of damage
to the environment and of the limitations inherent in the very mechanism of
reparation of this type of damage.”100
The obligation of states to take preventive measures constitutes an
important part of their obligation of due diligence. The obligation of due diligence
has been supported by a number of international conventions and non-binding
instruments and it “[has been] the standard basis for the protection of the
environment from harm.”101 The typical examples are article 194 (1) of UNCLOS
and article 2 of the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer.102
The ILC addressed in the 2001 Draft Articles that the obligation of due diligence
includes measures taken by states to “minimize risks of significant transboundary
harm or to prevent such harm.”103 Under the concept of due diligence, the notion
of prevention can be defined more clearly.104
ILA, supra note 8 at 22.
Sage-Fuller, supra note 1 at 77–78.
99 Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 51 at para 29.
100 GabCikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), [1997] ICJ Rep 7 at para 140.
101 ILC, supra note 7 at 154.
102 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, 22 March 1985, 1513 UNTS 293 (entered into force 22
September 1988). Other examples can be found in ILC, ibid at 154, nn 880–81.
103 ILC, supra note 7 at 161.
104 Sage-Fuller, supra note 1 at 79.
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A state of origin has an obligation of conduct. Under this obligation, states
are not required to “guarantee that significant harm be totally prevented” or that
“harm would not occur,” but are required to “exert [their] best possible efforts
to minimize the risk.”105 The commentaries to the Draft Articles also specified
that states should adopt appropriate laws and take administrative action regarding
risk management and take measures to ensure their compliance.106 The obligation
of due diligence is a continuous obligation for states, which requires them to take
measures appropriately and proportionally to “the degree of risk of
transboundary harm”.107

Under the obligation of prevention, however, activities with uncertain risks
may remain unregulated. This gap may be filled by the precautionary principle.
Up until now, the precautionary principle and the obligation to prevent harm
have been widely treated as separate principles. The Pulp Mills case and the Seabed
Mining Advisory Opinion highlighted that the principles of prevention and
precaution are actually interrelated. Judge Trindade in the Pulp Mills case criticized
the Court’s ignorance of the precautionary principle and advocated that this
principle should come into play when the preventive principle cannot fully
resolve the disputes between the parties. The Chamber, in its advisory opinion,
not only restated states’ obligations of due diligence to prevent harm, but further
clarified the content of due diligence and its relationship with states’ direct
obligations (including taking a precautionary measure). These opinions denote
that “the principle of prevention of harm could be extended in light of
precaution,” and the precautionary principle may “play a significant role in setting
the standard of due diligence in the context of scientific uncertainty.”108

ILC, supra note 7 at 154.
Ibid.
107 Ibid.
108 Sage-Fuller, supra note 1 at 81.
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In the 2014 Legal Principles relating to Climate Change, the International
Law Association also addressed the idea that prevention and precaution are
interrelated. The legal principles of prevention and precaution are both included
in draft article 7 due to their close internal link. Prevention deals with harm or
risks that are known or knowable and backed with adequate scientific evidence.
In advance of this state of relative certainty, precaution handles uncertain harm
or risk.109 Improvements in scientific knowledge may lead to “a finding of
stronger evidence of harm,” which may further result in “a transition from
precautionary to preventive measures.”110 Accordingly, these two principles can
be treated as “forming part of a continuum.”111

As early as 1999, the ITLOS made an implicit reference to the relationship
between obligations of due diligence and the precautionary approach in the
Southern Bluefin Tuna cases.112 Although the ITLOS could not fully assess the
scientific evidence provided by the parties, it was convinced that due to the
urgency of the situation, measures should be taken to protect the parties’ rights
and protect southern bluefin tuna from further degradation. It stated that the
parties in the case should proceed with due diligence in order to take conservation
measures.113 Although the Court in the Pulp Mills case circumvented the direct
application of the precautionary principle, Judges Al-Khasawneh, Simma and
Trindade indicated the potential application of this principle that had been
previously considered by the ITLOS in 1999. The Seabed Mining Advisory Opinion
shed some light on this point. The Seabed Chamber required states to take the
precautionary approach to realize the obligation of due diligence to prevent harm.

ILA, supra note 8 at 21–22.
Ibid at 22, 25.
111 Ibid at 22.
112 Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases (New Zealand v Japan; Australia v Japan) (27 August 1999), Order, the Seabed
Disputes Chamber of the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea, Nos 3 and 4.
113 Ibid at paras 77, 79–80.
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In summary, the application of the precautionary principle is closely related
to the due diligence obligation. On the one hand, the precautionary principle may
help clarify and enrich the obligation of due diligence both materially and
procedurally, especially in the circumstances where “there is insufficient evidence
but…the consequences may be severe and irreversible.”114 On the other hand,
the due diligence obligation may facilitate the application of the precautionary
approach in resolving disputes.

There is a close relationship between due diligence, prevention and
precaution. The court in the Pulp Mills case restated the status of the preventive
principle as an international custom and also indicated that this principle
originated in the obligation of due diligence. Under the due diligence, the notion
of prevention can be defined more clearly. A state should take all possible
measures to discharge the obligation of prevention.
The Seabed Mining Advisory Opinion further analyzed the notions of due
diligence and precaution by connecting states’ obligations of due diligence with
their direct obligations of precaution. The Chamber emphasized that the
precautionary approach is an integral part of the general obligation of due
diligence for states. The obligations of due diligence require states to exercise best
possible efforts to avoid harm to the Area or other states, even in face of
uncertainty. The content of due diligence may also be specified by reference to
the direct obligations that include the adoption of the precautionary approach.
Precaution and prevention have been widely regarded as separate concepts.
However, the Pulp Mills case and the Seabed Mining Advisory Opinion highlighted
that they are actually interrelated. They form part of a continuum in which the
precautionary concept may come to play in setting the standard of due diligence
in the context of scientific uncertainty. With the emergence of strong scientific
evidence, an obligation to take precautionary measures may become an obligation
to take preventive action.
114

ILA, supra note 8 at 26.

